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Countries unable or unwilling to join a Monetary Union can partly
replicate membership effects through either a Currency Board or
formal replacement of the domestic currency by the currency of the
Union. Schemes of this kind have been introduced recently in
Transition Economies. The net balance of costs and benefits
involved, for the country and the common currency area, are shown
to be an empirical question, depending on a number of conditions
and primarily on the degree of monetary, real, and institutional
convergence already achieved beforehand. Positive net advantages
may derive from dollar/Euro-isation but should not be taken for
granted.
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Non-Technical Summary
Countries unable or unwilling to join a Monetary Union can introduce dollarisation or, more
recently in central eastern Europe, DM- or Euro-isation, whether in the form of a Currency Board
permanently linking the national currency to the dollar/DM/Euro, or in the form of formal
replacement of the national currency by dollars/DM/Euros. Schemes of this kind, familiar from
Hong Kong or Argentina, have been introduced recently especially in the Transition Economies: e.g.
Currency Boards in Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Bosnia; DM-isation in Kosovo and in Montenegro,
also discussed in Poland and Bulgaria; prospective Euro-isation advocated for some post-Yugoslav
republics.
Potential benefits from such way of replicating membership of a currency area include: the
reduction of transaction costs and the benefits of ensuing greater trade and investment integration;
the lower interest rate that is expected from adopting a stronger and more credible currency; the
avoidance of both the turbolence associated with floating exchange rates, and the vulnerability to
capital inflows/outflows generating speculative crises in case of fixed exchange rates even if
successful; the ability for a government to borrow in the same currency in which its expenditure is
denominated and actually incurred.
However, the adoption of an external or common currency also has costs, as well as exaggerated
advantages. Large scale currency reserves are needed both to establish Currency Boards or to
formally replace a national currency. Even Currency Boards do not preclude the possibility of major
financial crises, for demand for foreign exchange could very well exceed the amount of primary
money, which is the only component of money supply fully matched by the Board’s reserves.
Underlying necessary trends of  real revaluation, commonly observable in developing and in
transition economies, may actually fuel inflation when nominal exchange rates are kept stable.
A country’s fundamentals may be highly specific and at odds with those of the country of area of the
alternative currency, i.e. shocks can be asymmetric. There is a loss of seigniorage, though a country
could arrange to share it with the Central Bank of the currency of choice. There is financial fragility
from the loss of a lender of last resort, though a Currency Board can still take this role if it has free
reserves.
The net benefits from using an external or common currency, as well as the full implications for the
country or area issuing that currency, require a theoretical exploration of all the relevant factors and
an empirical measurement of their relative weight in specific countries at a given time.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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1.  Introduction
The current simultaneous EU enlargement and monetary unification are about to create an
unprecedented economic segmentation in Europe.  Previous instances of enlargement and deepening
treated equally old members among themselves and, subject to short-lived transition arrangements,
old and new members.  Countries were either in or out of the EC; any other diversification pre-
existed and was not actually generated by the progress and pattern of European integration.
Membership of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is an integral part of the acquis
communautaire, which new and old members alike are committed to implement – subject to three
qualifications (see Temprano Arroyo and R.A. Feldman, 1999):
1)  possible “derogations”, such as those negotiated by the UK and Denmark, which at present no
new member is expected to request, let alone necessarily obtain if they did;
 
2)  before joining EMU, at least two year successful participation in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism
2, which Sweden has failed to implement to date;
 
3)  before examination of a country’s application to join EMU, achievement of the other Maastricht
Treaty standards for monetary and financial convergence, in terms of public debt and deficit,
inflation and interest rates
3; failure to achieve these standards delayed Greece membership of
EMU until the Lisbon summit of June 2000.
                      
1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Sixth Dubrovnik Economic Conference, on
“Exchange Rate and Financial Vulnerability in Emerging Markets”, 29-30 June 2000; and at the
12
th Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, London School of
Economics,7-10 July 2000, Panel on “The Economic Impact of Exclusion from EU and EMU”.
Acknowledgements are due to to Vincent Koen, Jacek Rostowski and Milica Uvalic, as well as
participants in both Conferences, for useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the
ESRC Programme “One Europe or Several?”, Project n. L213 25 2003, is gratefully acknowledged.
 
2 The ERM to which the Maastricht Treaty referred was replaced from 1-1-1999 by ERM-II,
including criteria such as the development of market integration, current-account balance,
monitoring of unit labour costs and other price indices.
 
3 More precisely, in addition to two year ERM-II membership: 1) an average rate of inflation over a
period of one year before the examination, not exceeding the average of the three best performing
member states by more than 1.5%; 2) an average nominal long-term interest rate on government
bonds, also over a period of one year before the examination, not exceeding by more than two
percentage points the average of the three best performing member states in terms of price stability;
3) a government deficit of at most 3% of GDP and 4) a government debt of at most 60% of GDP –William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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Europe, therefore, even if all new members opted to join EMU at the earliest possible date (and a
fortiori if they did not), in the European Union’s transition to a fully integrated and enlarged
Monetary Union is going to be segmented into at least four groups:
-  members of both EU and EMU (at present 12 including Greece);
-  members of the EU which are either excluded (Greece until recently) or self-excluded from
EMU (UK and Denmark; Sweden), soon to be joined by the next batch of new members for at
least their first two years ERM participation after accession (unless a record of exchange rate
stability was treated as equivalent to ERM, see below);
-  10 applicant countries from central Europe already engaged or soon to be engaged in detailed
accession negotiations: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia; plus Cyprus and Malta and, more recently,
Turkey, followed – or perhaps overtaken , for instance in the possible case of Croatia - by other
countries from south-eastern Europe. All these countries’ admission to EU is subject to
economic and political conditions and will be staggered over time beginning not earlier than
2003-4;
-  the rest of Europe and of the FSU, excluded from EMU at least for the foreseeable future.
Union and Euroland enlargement is going to have – in the words of ECB President Wim
Duisemberg – “deep and wide-ranging consequences” for the ECB (The Economist, 29-1-2000; see
also Bekx 1998).
Before EMU membership or, for the excluded or self-excluded, instead of EMU membership, there
are two possible and, most important, unilateral ways for countries to secure a closer monetary
integration with the EMU area if they wish:
The first is the adoption of a Currency Board managing a domestic currency linked to the Euro or
(until 2002 when Euro coins and banknotes will first appear) to any of the EMU-member
currencies; for the sake of convenience and of psychological impact the currency – whatever it is
called – could also be scaled so as to make its unit equivalent to one Euro, at no extra cost.
The second, more drastic alternative is the official adoption of the Euro or, until it has a bodily
existence, of any of the EMU-member currencies – plausibly the DM – as the exclusive or primary
domestic means of payment, which in many countries is facilitated by already existent unofficial
DM-isation or dollarisation.
This paper seeks to identify the theoretical and empirical issues involved in these options, and to
evaluate Euro-isation costs and benefits for both accession candidates and the EU and its member
states, drawing policy conclusions which should be relevant also for EU outsiders.
2. Euro-isation to date
Both a Currency Board and domestic currency replacement can be regarded as forms of Euro-
isation (by analogy with the more euphonic dollarisation, on which see Calvo 1999, IMF 1999, US
Senate JEC 1999, Berg and Borensztein 2000). The Currency Board is Euro-isation in a broad
                                                                          
unless the ratio for both deficit and/or debt is close to the reference values and either has already
declined substantially or exceeds the reference value only temporarily.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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sense, while the use of the actual Euro or other EMU-area means of payment are Euro-isation in a
strict sense – though both falling short of the full-fledged Euro-isation obtained through full EMU
membership.
Currency Boards with links to the DM or the Euro already exist in Estonia (8 kroons = 1 DM, i.e.
EEK 15.6466=1 Euro), Bulgaria (with the lev in 1997 originally tied to the DM then in 1999 re-
pegged to the Euro, which is the same thing, BGL 1.95583=1 Euro) and Bosnia, with the
“Convertible Mark” equivalent to the DM. Lithuania has a Currency  Board linked to the US dollar
(from 1994, 4 litas = 1 US$; see Korhonen 1999, 2000).  Any currency whose exchange rate is
irrevocably tied to a currency, the DM, which in turn is irrevocably fixed to the Euro, obviously is
already indirectly pegged to the Euro. Thus these countries could, like Bulgaria, switch from a link
to the DM to a link to the Euro (as they would have to do anyway in mid-2002 when the DM is
totally replaced by the Euro) at a stroke. This could be followed by a re-denomination of their
domestic currency so as to equal one Euro, opening the possibility even to beat the ECB at printing
the first Euro denominated banknotes. Indeed Estonia has put forward precisely such a proposal for
implementation in 2001 already before its accession (OECD, 2000). A working group was set up by
Premier Mart Laar to analyse the issue further; according to the vice-president of the Estonian
Central Bank, Mr Peter Lohmus, the main issue for Estonia is ensuring the “smoothest, least volatile
way into the euro system”, but no new issues could possibly arise that do not arise already under the
Currency Board regime.
The Euro is also the reference currency for the exchange rate pegs in the Czech Republic, Slovakia
and Slovenia (on the extremely diversified exchange rate regimes in the transition, see Nuti 1996a,
Backe’ 1999; Lavra 1997). Poland, Hungary and Romania are only partially linked to the Euro (the
first two respectively at 55% and 70% only), the residual still being represented by the US$ (see
Nuti, 2000a).
The Lithuanian Currency Board link to the US$ justifies the much lower degree of euro-optimism
there (see Korhonen 1996); the same considerations apply to any other country which has succeeded
in maintaining a fixed exchange rate in relation to a reference hard currency other than the Euro or
an EMU-member currency, such as Latvia’s lat (since 1994, an informal peg to the SDR has been
maintained, at 0.8 lats=1SDR, +/- 1%).
It can be argued that an EMU candidate that has experienced a period of pre-accession Euro-isation
in either form – Currency Board or currency replacement by an EMU currency – should have the
two-year ERM-II membership requirement shortened or even waived.  Indeed the same treatment
may be plausibly requested by any other country that has maintained an exchange rate stability
comparable to that of ERM-II in the run up to accession.  The Latvian Lat, for instance, having
maintained its peg to the SDR in spite of the August 1998 Russian crisis and its significant impact
on all Baltic economies, also deserves to have its two years waiting time significantly shortened;
Latvia’s foreign minister Indulis Berzins has announced that his country hopes to join the euro-zone
as early as 2003. Neither enlargement nor successful unilateral Euro-isation were being
contemplated when the Maastricht Treaty was being negotiated – hence the case for relaxing the
two-year ERM-II membership, though not automatic, is exceptionally strong.
Informal DM-isation already exists on a large scale in Eastern Europe and the FSU, though often
dominated by (informal) dollarisation. In 1995 the German Bundesbank estimated that about 30% to
40% of all DM notes and coins in circulation were held abroad (Seitz 1995), which compares with a
Federal Reserve estimate of 40%-60% for the US dollar (corresponding to $192-288bn, Feige et al.,
2000). Montenegro has formally adopted the DM as a dual legal tender next to the Yugoslav dinar;William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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the DM is de facto the domestic currency in Kosovo.  Any DM-ised country would eventually – in
2002 – become strictly Euro-ised.
Proposals for an extension of the Currency Board regime have been put forward for other EU
accession candidates, e.g. by Mundell 1998, Gros 1999, CEPS 1999 (for a similar plan for
Argentina see Hanke and Schuler 1999; for a cautionary comment on such proposals see Daviddi
1999). Bratkowski and Rostowski (2000) recommend an early official replacement of the Polish
zloty by Euro.
3.  Advantages of Euro-isation.
By and large the prevailing view, both in economic literature and in policy circles, is that Euro-
isation has immediate, and dominant, positive net advantages, especially in transition countries
where government institutions lack the credibility and track record needed to successfully adopt
alternative exchange rate regimes and the monetary policies necessary to back them.
An argument for dollar- or Euro-isation is the national governments’ ability to overcome their
inability otherwise to borrow internationally in their domestic currency (Hausmann, 1999, 2000).
Euro-/dollar-isation also avoids both the volatility and inflationary bias of floating rates, and the
vulnerability to speculative crises of fixed rates that are not irrevocably fixed (see Mundell 2000).
Even successful regimes of fixed exchange rate can be made vulnerable by their own success, as
they attract capital inflows which lead to real revaluation undermining competitiveness; at some
point those flows can be easily, suddenly and massively reversed.  Irrevocably fixed rates, unlike
pegs subject to intermittent adjustments, do not encourage speculation – as demonstrated by the
experience of EMU members since May 1998 as opposed to the September 1992 ERM crisis and its
abandonment by the UK and Italy (a difference neglected by Larrain and Sachs, 1999, in their feeble
rehearsal of arguments against dollarisation).
In addition, the benefits of Euro-isation, as in the case of monetary unification, are:
-  lower transaction costs, precisely as for the EMU members;
 
-  greater economic integration, through both greater trade and greater foreign direct investment,
especially if Euro-isation is accompanied by mutual trade liberalisation or possibly a free trade
area without the considerable restrictions still impeding trade with present European Associates
candidates for accession (see section 9 below);
 
-  probably lower basic interest rates in comparable units than otherwise would be the case (though
interest rates are invariably higher than in the reference country, for they are subject to risk
premia for any individual country or borrower), in the case of a Currency Board; maybe even
lower interest rates for domestic currency replacement by actual Euros.
Finally, Euro-isation would involve automatic, self-regulating adjustments in money supply, which
in both cases – Currency Board and currency replacement – would be determined by trends in
domestically held foreign assets, expanding for a balance of payments surplus and contracting at
times of deficits, as it is supposed to happen under a gold standard.
Unlike partial, unofficial Euro- or dollar-isation, total and official currency replacement would not
complicate the choice of intermediate targets of monetary policy by introducing a dual currencyWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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component in the money supply, and would not impress the shocks of exchange rate adjustments on
producers and financial institutions.
Initially, Euro-isation might be accompanied by a degree of under-valuation of the old currency with
respect to the Euro; this weakness may be compounded by an initial weakness of the Euro with
respect to other hard currencies (as in 1999-2000). Under-valuation might be a blessing in disguise
for the viewpoint of competitiveness and employment (though not for inflation; see below).
3.  Possible disadvantages: differences from EMU membership
While it is perfectly possible that Euro-isation forms should yield the expected net advantages, this
should not be by any means a foregone conclusion. It is not just a question of a possible rejection of
Euro-isation on grounds of national pride, with countries temporarily or permanently excluded from
EMU hanging on to a domestic currency as a symbol of national sovereignty. Whether forms of
Euro-isation can be successful is an empirical question, depending on the relative strength of
accompanying disadvantages. In fact the local adoption of the Euro as domestic currency – whether
as a banknote or as a backing for domestic banknotes – is not at all the same thing as being a
member of EMU.
There are distinct disadvantages associated with the operation of a Currency Board with respect to
EMU Membership (see Nuti et al., 1995, 1997).
I)  A Currency Board regime needs initial endowment with sufficient foreign exchange reserves
to back the entire currency in circulation (whether new or unchanged) at the permanently
fixed exchange rate pre-selected by the government.  Estonia benefited from the return of 11
tonnes of gold which had been sent to the West before 1940; Lithuania also benefited from
the return of 6 tonnes of gold as well as purchases from the IMF (OECD 2000).  Other
countries might be less fortunate: Bratkowski and Rostowski claim that Poland (with US$
26bn, i.e. twice the reserves necessary to back or replace the domestic currency), the Czech
Republic and Slovenia certainly could afford Euro-isation, while Slovakia and Hungary are
classed as “possible”.
Gros (1999) suggests that the resources necessary to introduce a Currency Board (which he
estimates at $269mn for the Former Yugoslav republics, probably an under-estimate) could
be borrowed, but this would undermine credibility and lead to expectations that the
exchange rate would not be permanent but would only last as long as the loan would last and
be renewed. The arrangement would be indistinguishable from an ordinary fixed exchange
rate regime subject to occasional adjustments. Instead reserves must be instantly and
permanently available against possible requests for conversion, therefore a Currency Board
cannot be run on borrowed money – unless, as in Bulgaria, finance is being provided only
partly by Bretton Woods institutions, and on a long term basis, in which case foreign lending
amounts to assistance and really might as well take the form not of a loan but a gift.
 
II)  Loss of seigniorage – the revenue obtained from issuing domestic currency. Such loss is
sometimes under-estimated (for instance Bratkowski and Rostowski, 2000, neglect the loss
of likely increases in seigniorage after shedding the domestic currency) but it can also be
over-played (e.g. by Larrain and Sachs 1999). In the Currency Board case this loss could be
offset at least partly by interest earned on reserves. Also, seigniorage sharing arrangement
could be agreed with the ECB (Calvo 1999, Daviddi 1999); such an arrangement isWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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contemplated for dollarised countries by the International Monetary Stability Act of 2000,
introduced in the US Senate by the Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee Senator
Connie Mack. According to Larry Summers “In the long term, finding ways of bribing
people to dollarise, or at least give back the extra currency that is earned when dollarisation
takes place, ought to be an international priority …” (Quoted in US-Senate Joint Economic
Committee, 1999): the same argument would apply to Euro-isation.
 
III)  Lack of a lender of last resort, which would involve a considerable degree of financial
fragility, particularly serious in the early stages of transition.  The International Monetary
Stability Act cited above specifically states that “The Federal Reserve System has no
obligation to act as a lender of last resort to the financial systems of dollarised countries”
(Section 2.b). The mythical advantage of a Currency Board is that the domestic currency is
“fully backed” by foreign exchange (e.g. see The Economist 29-1-2000). Thus the Board
could only lend as a last resort only any excess reserves it might have over and above what is
required to back the domestic currency; such reserves would be substantial in Poland but
nowhere else in the area.
Unfortunately all that is backed up by foreign exchange is primary money, i.e. M0, whereas
in a currency crisis there is absolutely nothing to prevent the public from wishing to convert
into foreign exchange more than M0, up to their entire liquid assets, i.e. anything up to M2.
In this case limits would have to be introduced – whether de facto or de jure – on the
convertibility of bank money into cash, thus re-instating a monetary segmentation which was
one of the typical features of the old-style centrally planned economy. In a “normal”
monetary economy this occurrence is prevented – short of a total melt-down – by the
national Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort, in principle standing-by to provide
unlimited liquidity at a penal interest rate against good quality securities.
It follows that either the country has an arrangement for the ECB to act as lender of last
resort – which would expose ECB and ultimately the Euro to an intolerable risk for countries
not constrained to Maastricht Treaty parameters of fiscal and monetary convergence - or the
ECB does not act as lender of last resort in the Euro-ised country, in which case its financial
system will be particularly fragile, and a financial crisis would take the form of a premium
for DM/Euro cash over DM/Euro bank money.  Stand-by arrangements by private banks
taking on a lender of last resort function (Calvo, 1999) may have limited effect. Banks could
be bankrupted as a result, not for straight insolvency, which might be regarded as a
necessary and even desirable development, but for sheer illiquidity artificially created by the
Currency Board rules of monetary issue. The problem would be aggravated by the fact that
the ECB could not take on any responsibility for the supervision of financial institutions in
Euro-ised countries (a provision to that effect is included in the US International Monetary
Stability Act for the Federal Reserve System).
 
IV)  Impossibility of eliminating entirely the risk of a parity change – whether under a Currency
Board regime or even currency replacement (Larrain and Sachs 1999 regard this as
irreversible, while Bratkowski and Rostowski 2000 contemplate the a possible reversal). By
linking its domestic currency to a more credible currency a government – contrary to what is
widely believed – cannot acquire the other currency’s credibility; government policy
credibility will be the product of its own and the other currency’s credibility (in other words,
the strength of a chain cannot be greater than that of its weakest link). Currency replacement,
say, with DMs might give rise to a DM scarcity unless interest rates were raised (or
aggregate demand otherwise lowered) enough to match demand for and supply of cash.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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V)  The transformation of current account deficits arising in a domestic currency at the risk of
currency crises into regional under-development risks in a single currency area, especially
without the provisions for transfers from the EU budgets which would only benefit EU
members. Bratkowski and Rostowski (2000) see the rise of current account deficits as the
inevitable consequence of consumption-smoothing in countries experiencing or expecting
growth acceleration, and regard the elimination of currency crises risk as a major benefit of
Euro-isation. Even if this benefit was so obtained, it would be matched by the risk of
regional under-development instead, which may be potentially more difficult to deal with,
and span over a longer run, than a temporary currency crisis.
3.  Possible disadvantages: unsuitability of any peg to the Euro
In addition to the disadvantages due to Euro-isation falling short of full EMU Membership, there is
the possible unsuitability of the Euro as a pegging currency in any form. Namely:
I)  The Euro may not be the preferred currency in the country’s invoicing practices in foreign
trade. Settlement practices are often regarded as relevant but they are immaterial. For
instance, Helmut Aancans, head of monetary policy at the Latvian central bank, is quoted as
saying that “Our structure of settlement currencies reflects the SDR basket … When the euro
goes down the dollar goes up and there is no net instability” (FT 16 February 2000). But
such stability only obtains if the SDR is the currency in which contracts are denominated.
The Lithuanian Lita, pegged to the US dollar, has appreciated instead in real terms with
respect to other currencies used in its pricing and invoicing, thus incurring a large scale
current account deficit. “Trade in Euros is not as big as trade in dollars” (Lithuanian CB
deputy governor Arvidas Krejzde, FT 16/2/00), but 40% of their foreign trade is with the EU
and appreciation is therefore a non-negligible problem.
 
II)  Moreover, a number of countries have raised a very large part of their external debt in US
dollar: in 1997 the share of dollar-denominated external debt was 77.9% in the Czech
Republic, 75.1% in Bulgaria, 61.6% in Lithuania, 46% in Poland, against DM shares
respectively of 4.7%, 4.7%, 6.2%, 9.9%, (Deutche Bank Research, 2000). For such countries
any Euro devaluation with respect to the dollar, such as it has occurred in the first eighteen
months of Euro’s life in 1999-2000, would raise the domestic burden of foreign debt service;
a significant re-denomination of external debt would have to accompany their Euro-isation.
 
III)  Inflationary implications of any fixed peg to the Euro (i.e. even short of a Currency Board)
to the long term real exchange rate revaluation which has been observed and can be expected
in all transition economies. Real revaluation is usually associated with the so-called Harrod-
Balassa-Samuelson effect, of faster productivity in tradables driving up wages and prices in
non-tradables, but this effect can easily be overplayed: after all, tradables are both inputs in
non-tradable goods, and substitutes for non-tradables. Regardless of this effect, or in
addition to it, any exchange rate (whether fixed or floating) at which convertibility is
introduced in inflationary and troubled times is bound to be undervalued in real terms. For a
fixed nominal exchange rate, real revaluation can only be achieved through a positive
inflationary differential with respect to the peg currency.  Far from aiding the control of
inflation, in such circumstances a fixed exchange rate regime can turn into an inexorable
inflationary machine. The necessary real revaluation could be only be achieved without
inflation through a nominal revaluation.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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Of course a real revaluation can be inconsistent with the parallel commitments to price
stability and nominal exchange rate stability within the bounds of the Maastricht criteria, and
unilateral Euro-isation can be seen (Bratkowski and Rostowski, 2000) as a way to evade
those bounds. However the very broad fluctuation margins envisaged by ERM II (+/- 15%)
and the applicability of the Maastricht inflation limits only in the run up to EMU
membership – for just one year before examination – should still leave large enough scope to
accommodate the necessary real revaluation without violating the Maastricht criteria for
price and nominal exchange rate stability.
 
IV)  More generally, unsuitability of the monetary policy pursued by the ECB to the
fundamentals of the countries undertaking Euro-isation. Apart from providing liquidity to
Euro-ised countries against foreign exchange, the ECB would have no obligation to consider
their particular needs; just as, in the International Monetary Stability Act quoted above, it is
stated that “the Federal Reserve System has no obligation to consider the economic
conditions of dollarised countries when formulating or implementing monetary policy”
(Section 2.b). De Grauwe and Aksoy (1997, see also De Grauwe and Lavra 1997) investigate
whether Central European countries are part of a European optimum currency area (as
theorised by Mundell in his classic 1961 article) and conclude that they are not.
Of course the stabilisation needs of transition economies may not leave much margin for an
independent monetary policy, which is totally lost for any fixed exchange rate regime, but
the instant abatement of inflation may not necessarily be the best policy, as confirmed by the
dominant success of the Polish economy which for all the talk of shock therapy has been dis-
inflated at an excruciatingly gradual rate. Moreover, all central eastern European transition
economy are facing extremely challenging issues of social welfare reform, on a greater scale
than the rest of Europe (see Nuti et al., 2000). Before worrying about convergence, many
transition regions such as Serbia or Kosovo would have to worry about reconstruction (IMF
and World Bank, 1999). Also, the experience of Bosnia, where the DM continues to
circulate as a parallel currency (though to a rapidly diminishing extent), shows that even the
adoption of a Currency Board can be ineffective unless it is preceded by extensive economic
and political reforms.
All the arguments in this section make a case not against unilateral Euro-isation per se but, more
generally, against early membership of EMU. However, seeing that the main, indeed the only point
of unilateral Euro-isation is that of replicating the effects of joining EMU earlier than otherwise
possible, these are also arguments against unilateral Euro-isation.
3.  Costs and benefits for ECB and the EMU Members
Euro-isation of countries outside EMU would also involve advantages and disadvantages for the
ECB and for EMU members (on the mutual impact of EU and transition economies, see Nuti 1994,
1996b). The main advantage would be seigniorage, net of the possible net cost of ECB sterilisation
of the Currency Board country’s Euro bonds and deposits if their effects on Euro monetary
expansion are judged to be excessive.  An additional advantage would be avoiding the
complications generated by the growth in ECB governing council’s membership following EMU
enlargement (which otherwise would require complex solutions such as the drawing of
constituencies, rotation, or outright exclusions). The main disadvantage would be the risk of a
monetary expansion in the Currency Board country generated by its accumulation of non-EuroWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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assets, if it was sufficiently threatening to induce some loss of ECB control over the monetary mass
of Euros and Euro-substitutes; in view of the small size of the accession economies, however, this is
a remote possibility.
Euro-isation in the strict sense of currency replacement would have similar implications for the
Euro-ised country, except that its introduction would probably be partial and spontaneous at the end
of a hyper-inflation process, its legalisation the only form of necessary administrative sanction; loss
of seigniorage (unless it was shared out by the ECB) would be unmitigated; all the other drawbacks
of a Currency Board would apply. For the ECB and the EMU-area, the risk of monetary expansion
originating outside would be much less likely for outright currency replacement than in the
Currency Board case, because the ECB would retain control over primary Euro-supply.
7. Convergence?
A great deal of attention has been given both to financial and monetary convergence as represented
by the Maastricht criteria (table 1), and to the progress of systemic transition as exemplified by the
EBRD scoreboard in the Transition Reports of 1994-1999 (table 2). On both counts the picture is
encouraging, at least for the front-runners lined up for accession, but also very misleading.  The
share of government deficit and debt in GDP are below or near the Maastricht parameters; inflation
and interest rates are much higher but still within striking distance in most cases; the transition
progress recorded by the EBRD, especially in privatisation and foreign trade, is impressive. But
Maastricht criteria ignore essential and worrying features of transition economies such as quasi-
fiscal deficits and debt, due to public contingent commitments, extra-budgetary funds, hidden
subsidies; they also ignore non-performing loans in the balance sheets of state banks, or the low
share of credit to the private sector, the low capitalisation and/or low liquidity of financial markets
throughout transition economies, as well as the extra-ordinary volatility of their rates of return (see
EBRD, 2000).  Once quasi-fiscal items are taken into account, even seemingly virtuous candidates
such as the Czech Republic lose much of their attraction (see Drabek, 2000). The share of credit to
the private sector appears to be inversely related to the share of bad loans (EBRD, 1997). Transition
economies seem to have either low market capitalisation or low ratio of value traded to market
capitalisation (i.e. illiquidity) of their stock markets – e.g. respectively 2.6 and 36.3 per cent of GDP
in Romania, 39.7 and 3.9 per cent in Russia – or both, e.g. 5.8 and 7.6 per cent in Bulgaria and 6.2
and 11.6 per cent in Latvia (EBRD, 2000).
The EBRD indicators suffer from an over-optimistic bias, not least because of the adoption of
scores ranging from 1 to 4+ instead of starting from zero, which therefore credit even transition non-
starters with an achievement of over 20% of the road to a full-fledged market economy (see Nuti,
2000b). They also neglect any notion of minimum requisites for a country to operate as a market
economy, or of possible weights to be attached to their different indicators, or of the relative
difficulty of making progress at different points of their scores and in different fields. Real
convergence of transition economies – apart from their almost instant convergence to EU
unemployment average and variance, not requested by any treaty but promptly achieved already in
the early 1990s – appears to be a much slower and more protracted process than anticipated (see
Kolodko, 2000; see also Salvatore, 2000).
These considerations invite greater caution in assessing the progress of new members’ convergence
to single European Union standard – and therefore in evaluating the net advantages to be obtained
from both their membership of the EMU and from possible EMU membership surrogates.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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8.  Improved trade access versus monetary integration
The primary purpose of monetary integration, and of Euro-isation as its earlier substitute, is that of
promoting the economic integration of central-eastern European countries with the EU. This
purpose could be achieved, to a much greater extent than it is being achieved under current
arrangements, simply by the EU unilaterally removing or at any rate reducing residual trade barriers
with those countries, such as those of CAP, quotas for lower duty trade as in textiles, impositions of
“voluntary” as in the case of steel, anti-dumping provisions, and other measures of contingent
protection in case of “injury” or “likely injury” to national producers.  The European Association
Agreements signed with all accession candidates envisaged the creation of a free trade area in ten
years, in two stages, with the immediate removal of quantitative restrictions and the gradual
abatement of import tariffs at a faster rate (but from a higher level) in the EU, but the process –
speeded up by only six months after the momentous Copenhagen summit that paved the way to
eastern enlargement –is still incomplete and residual barriers, though falling, are still a significant
impediment to trade. Meanwhile European Union members have turned their trade balance with the
ten accession candidates from a deficit of ECU 2bn in 1989 to a steadily increasing surplus up to
over ECU 21bn in 1998.
The EU surplus occurs with every single one of the ten countries; it originates primarily in
manufacturing products, especially for investment and intermediate goods, but it arises even for
food and beverages – with the exception of Hungary – and for labour intensive products – with the
exception of the Czech Republic, Romania and to a smaller extent Bulgaria (see Smith, 2000).
In these circumstances there is no justification for the European Union to resist by means of
artificial barriers a higher volume of imports from central-eastern European countries – whether or
not they are accession candidates. The relative impact of EU trade opening on these countries can be
gauged by reference to the well known asymmetry in the importance of mutual trade turnover,
amounting to 3-4% of total trade for the EU and around 60% for central-eastern Europe. Greater
trade access granted by the EU could be matched by parallel, automatic or conditional reduction of
remaining barriers to EU exports in central-eastern European countries, such as import surcharges
and other, mostly retaliatory restrictions.  Greater central-eastern European net exports would not
only speed up real convergence but also alleviate social problems and – last but not least –
presumably reduce labour migration pressures to the EU.
The two ways to intensify economic integration – monetary unification or Euro-isation, and the
removal of residual trade barriers – are not at all in conflict with each other, and could be pursued
simultaneously, mutually enhancing their effectiveness. Indeed, they could be pursued and
implemented even before accession. It is simply inappropriate – for the EU and accession
candidates alike – to place almost exclusive emphasis on enlargement and monetary unification
neglecting at the same time the existing, immediate opportunities for deeper and faster trade
integration.
9.  Conclusions
To a visitor from outer space the arrangements of the present EMU-area and those of the wider
Euro-area enlarged to include strict Euro-isation and/or Euro-backed local currency would be
absolutely indistinguishable. But there would be an immensely important difference, in the different
role of the ECB, which in a strictly Euro-ised country would not act as a central bank. Namely, theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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ECB would not a lender of last resort; it would act – by definition – as an institute of issue but
would not have any responsibility towards a Euro-ised non-EMU-member country in deciding its
monetary or exchange rate policy.
Ultimately the net balance of costs and benefits, both for the Euro-ised country and for Euroland
and its members, is an empirical question depending on the degree of monetary, real, and
institutional convergence already achieved before Euro-isation and its subsequent progress; initial
endowment of currency reserves; initial currency of choice for invoicing and payment practices in
foreign trade; the size and denomination of foreign debt; the already existing degree of utilisation of
foreign exchange in the domestic economy; international credibility of domestic monetary
institutions; the degree of co-operation between domestic and European institutions, both political
and monetary.
Current trends in financial and monetary convergence, and even more so in institutional and real
convergence, are probably over-optimistically evaluated by observers and officials. Positive net
advantages may well derive from Euro-isation but should not be taken for granted. Meanwhile, the
unexploited potential for greater economic integration through greater trade access to EU markets
should not be neglected.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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Table 1.  EMU Convergence Criteria: Central and East European accession candidates in comparison (January 2000).




 2) 1997 1998
 1) 1999 
2) 1996 1997 1998 




2.7 2.1 2.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 6.77 (10Y) ERM II
BG 1,082 22.3 2.0 -3.0 1.0 n.a. n.a n.a n.a n.a Currency Board (EUR)
CZ 8.5 10.7 2.5 -1.2 -1.5 -3.8 9.9 10.3 10.7 7.01 (5Y) Flexible
EE 11.2 8.2 3.3 2.2 -0.3 -3.0 6.9 5.6 4.6 n.a Currency Board (EUR)
HU 18.3 14.3 9.0 -4.5 -4.8 -4.3 71.5 62.9 59.8 9.17 (10Y) Peg (EUR)
LT 8.9 5.1 1.6 -1.8 -5.8 -7.0 n.a n.a n.a n.a Currency Board (EUR)
LV 8.4 4.7 2.2 0.1 -0.8 -3.8 n.a n.a n.a n.a Peg (SDR)
PL 14.9 11.8 7.0 -1.3 -1.2 -3.0 51.1 46.3 41.0 10.15 (10Y) Peg (EUR/USD basket)
RO 154.8 59.2 45.0 -3.6 -3.1 -5.0 24.3 26.1 26.4 n.a Flexible
SI 8.4 8.0 7.5 -1.7 -1.4 -1.0 23.2 23.5 24.0 n.a Flexible
SK 6.1 6.7 10.6 -4.4 -5.8 -3.2 n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. Flexible




From: Deutsche Bank Research, Euro Watch n. 82, February 2000.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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Table 2.        Progress in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the
Baltic states and the CIS














































Albania 7 52423422 2 -
Armenia 6 03 3 + 2342 2 + 2
Azerbaijan 45 2- 3 2 3 3+ 1 2 2-
Belarus 2 0121 2 - 1212
Bosnia &
Herzegovina
3 52 22 -33 -12 +1
Bulgaria 6 033 + 2 +34 +23 -2
Croatia 6 03 4 + 3 - 3423 2 +
Czech Republic 8 044 +3 34 +33 +3
Estonia 75 4 4+ 3 3 4 3- 4- 3
FYR Macedonia 5 53423413 2 -
Georgia 6 0 3 + 42342 2 + 1
Hungary 8 0 4 4 +3 +3 +4 + 3 4 3 +
Kazakhstan 5 5342332 2 + 2
Kyrgyzstan 6 0342342 2 + 2
Latvia 6 53 43 -34 + 3 -32 +
Lithuania 7 034 + 3 -3 42 +33 -
Moldova 4 53 3 + 2342 2 + 2
Poland 6 53 + 4 +33 + 4 +33 + 3 +
Romania 6 0 3 - 4 - 2342 3 - 2
Russian
Federation
7 03 + 4 2 -3 -2 +2 +2 -2 -
Slovak Republic 7 544 +3 34 +33 - 2 +
Slovenia 5 53 + 4 + 3 -34 +23 +3
Tajikistan 3 02 +32 -33 -1 1 1
Turkmenistan 2 5 2 - 2 2 - 21111
Ukraine 5 5 2 + 3 + 233222
Uzbekistan 4 5 3 - 32212 2 - 2
*  The "private sector shares" of GDP
represent rough EBRD estimates, based on
available statistics from both official
(government) sources and unofficial sources.
The underlying concept of private sector value
added includes income generated by the
activity of private registered companies as
well as by private entities engaged in
informal activity in those cases where
reliable information on informal activity is
available. Here the term “ private companies”
refers to all enterprises in which a majority
of the shares are owned by private individuals
or entities. The roughness of the EBRD
estimates reflects data limitations,
particularly with respect to the scale of
informal activity. The EBRD estimates may in
some cases differ markedly from available data
from official sources on the contribution to
GDP made by the “ private sector”  or by the
“ non-state sector” . This is in most cases
because the definition of the EBRD conceptWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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differs from that of the official estimates.
Specifically for the CIS countries, official
data in most cases refer to value added in the
“ non-state sector” , a broad concept which
incorporates collective farms as well as
companies in which only a minority stake has
been privatised.
From EBRD Transition Report 1999,
November, London.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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Large-scale privatisation
1 Little private ownership.
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed.
3 More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process
of being privatised (with the process having reached a stage at which the state has
effectively ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues
regarding corporate governance.
4 More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and
significant progress on corporate governance of these enterprises.
Small-scale privatisation
2 Substantial share privatised.
3 Nearly comprehensive programme implemented.
4 Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights.
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state ownership of
small enterprises; effective tradability of land.
Governance & enterprise restructuring
1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial discipline
at the enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate governance.
2 Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy but weak enforcement of bankruptcy legislation
and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate governance.
3 Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote corporate
governance effectively (e.g. through privatisation combined with tight credit and subsidy
policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation).
Price liberalisation
2 Price controls for several important product categories, state procurement at non-market
prices remains substantial.
3 Substantial progress on price liberalisation: state procurement at non-market prices
largely phased out.
Trade & foreign exchange system
1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign
exchange.
2 Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account
convertibility in principle but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully
transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates).
3 Removal of almost all quantitative  and administrative import and export restrictions;
almost full current account convertibility.
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart from
agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in
exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major non-
uniformity of custom duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full current account
convertibility.
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most tariff
barriers; WTO membership.
Competition policy
1 No competition legislation or institutions.
2 Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of entry
restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms.
3 Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive
environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; substantial reduction of
entry restrictions.
Banking reform & interest rate liberalisation
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system.
2 Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of direct
credit or interest rate liberalisation ceilings.
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential
supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential
access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and significant
presence of private banks.
4 Significant movement of banking laws and regulation towards BIS standards; well-
functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term
lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening.
Securities markets & non-bank financial institutions
1 Little progress.
2 Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers; some trading in government
paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the issuance and
trading of securities.
3 Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of independentWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 340
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share registries, secure clearance and settlement procedures, and some protection of
minority shareholders; emergence of non-bank financial institutions (e.g. investment
funds, private insurance and pension funds, leasing companies) and associated regulatory
framework.THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
CURRENT AS OF 10/23/00
Publication Authors Date of Paper
No. 340 The Costs and Benefits of Euro-
isation in Central-Eastern Europe Before or
Instead of EMU Membership
D. Mario Nuti October 2000
No. 339  Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia Sergei Guriev, Igor Makarov and Mathilde
Maurel
September 2000
No. 338 Firm Performance and the Political
Economy of Corporate Governance: Survey
Evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia
Patrick Paul Walsh and Ciara Whela July 2000
No. 337   Investment and Instability Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B. Nugent May 2000
No. 336 The Evolution of the Insurance
Sector in Central and Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union
Robert B.K. Pye August 2000
No. 335 Institutional Technology and the
Chains of Trust: Capital Markets and
Privatization in Russia and the Czech
Republic
Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer August 2000
No. 334  The Evolution of Market Integration
in Russia
Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong August 2000
No. 333 Efficiency and Market Share in
Hungarian Corporate Sector
László Halpern and Gábor Kőrösi July 2000
No. 332  Search-Money-and-Barter Models of
Financial Stabilization
S.I. Boyarchenko and S.Z. Levendorskii July 2000
No. 331 Worker Training in a Restructuring
Economy: Evidence from the Russian
Transition
Mark C. Berger, John S. Earle and Klara
Z. Sabirianova
August 2000
No. 330 Economic Development in Palanpur
1957-1993: A Sort of Growth
Peter Lanjouw August 2000
No. 329  Trust, Organizational Controls,
Knowledge Acquisition from the Foreign
Parents, and Performance in Vietnamese
International Joint Ventures
Marjorie A. Lyles, Le Dang Doanh, and
Jeffrey Q. Barden
June 2000
No. 328  Comparative Advertising in the
Global Marketplace:  The Effects of Cultural
Orientation on Communication
Zeynep Gürhan-Canli and Durairaj
Maheswaran
August 2000
No. 327 Post Privatization Enterprise
Restructuring
Morris Bornstein July 2000
No. 326 Who is Afraid of Political Instability? Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B. Nugent July 2000
No. 325 Business Groups, the Financial
Market and Modernization
Raja Kali June 2000
No. 324 Restructuring with What Success?  A
Case Study of Russian Firms
Susan Linz July 2000
No. 323 Priorities and Sequencing in
Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the
Czech Republic
Nandini Gupta, John C. Ham and Jan
Svejnar
May 2000THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 322 Liquidity, Volatility, and Equity
Trading Costs Across Countries and Over
Time
Ian Domowitz, Jack Glen and Ananth
Madhavan
March 2000
No. 321 Equilibrium Wage Arrears:
Institutional Lock-In of Contractual Failure in
Russia
John S. Earle and Klara Z. Sabirianova October 2000
No. 320 Rethinking Marketing Programs for
Emerging Markets
Niraj Dawar and Amitava Chattopadhyay June 2000
No. 319 Public Finance and Low Equilibria in
Transition Economies; the Role of Institutions
Daniel Daianu and Radu Vranceanu June 2000
No. 318 Some Econometric Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Active Labour Market
Programmes in East Germany
Martin Eichler and Michael Lechner June 2000
No. 317 A Model of Russia’s “Virtual
Economy”
R.E Ericson and B.W Ickes May 2000
No. 316 Financial Institutions, Financial
Contagion, and Financial Crises
Haizhou Huang and Chenggang Xu March 2000
No. 315 Privatization versus Regulation in
Developing Economies: The Case of West
African Banks
Jean Paul Azam, Bruno Biais, and
Magueye Dia
February 2000
No. 314 Is Life More Risky in the Open?
Household Risk-Coping and the Opening of
China’s Labor Markets
John Giles April 2000
No. 313 Networks, Migration and Investment:
Insiders and Outsiders in Tirupur’s
Production Cluster
Abhijit Banerjee and Kaivan Munshi March 2000
No. 312 Computational Analysis of the Impact
on India of the Uruguay Round and the
Forthcoming WTO Trade Negotiations
Rajesh Chadha, Drusilla K. Brown, Alan
V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern
March 2000
No. 311 Subsidized Jobs for Unemployed
Workers in Slovakia
Jan. C. van Ours May 2000
No. 310 Determinants of Managerial Pay in
the Czech Republic
Tor Eriksson, Jaromir Gottvald and Pavel
Mrazek
May 2000
No. 309 The Great Human Capital
Reallocation: An Empirical Analysis of
Occupational Mobility in Transitional Russia
Klara Z. Sabirianova October 2000
No. 308 Economic Development, Legality, and
the Transplant Effect
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and
Jean-Francois Richard
February 2000
No. 307 Community Participation, Teacher
Effort, and Educational Outcome: The Case of
El Salvador’s EDUCO Program
Yasuyuki Sawada November 1999
No. 306 Gender Wage Gap and Segregation
in Late Transition
Stepan Jurajda May 2000
No. 305 The Gender Pay Gap in the
Transition from Communism: Some Empirical
Evidence
Andrew Newell and Barry Reilly May 2000
No. 304 Post-Unification Wage Growth  in
East Germany
Jennifer Hunt November 1998
No. 303 How Does Privatization Affect
Workers?  The Case of the Russian Mass
Privatization Program
Elizabeth Brainerd May 2000THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 302 Liability for Past Environmental
Contamination and Privatization
Dietrich Earnhart March 2000
No. 301 Varieties, Jobs and EU Enlargement Tito Boeri and Joaquim Oliveira Martins May 2000
No. 300 Employer Size Effects in Russia Todd Idson April 2000
No. 299 Information Complements,
Substitutes, and Strategic Product Design
Geoffrey G. Parker and Marshall W. Van
Alstyne
March 2000
No. 298 Markets, Human Capital, and
Inequality: Evidence from Rural China
Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt, Paul
Glewwe, and Li Guo
May 2000
No. 297 Corporate Governance in the Asian
Financial Crisis
Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair
Breach, and Eric Friedman
November 1999
No. 296 Competition and Firm Performance:
Lessons from Russia
J. David Brown and John S. Earle March 2000
No. 295 Wage Determination in Russia: An
Econometric Investigation
Peter J. Luke and Mark E. Schaffer March 2000
No. 294: Can Banks Promote Enterprise
Restructuring?: Evidence From a Polish
Bank’s Experience
John P. Bonin and Bozena Leven March 2000
No. 293: Why do Governments Sell Privatised
Companies Abroad?
Bernardo Bortolotti, Marcella Fantini and
Carlo Scarpa
March 2000
No. 292: Going Public in Poland: Case-by-
Case Privatizations, Mass Privatization and
Private Sector Initial Public Offerings
Wolfgang Aussenegg December 1999
No. 291: Institutional Technology and the
Chains of Trust: Capital Markets and
Privatization in Russia and the Czech
Republic
Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer March 1999
No. 290: Banking Crises and Bank Rescues:
The Effect of Reputation
Jenny Corbett and Janet Mitchell January 2000
No. 289: Do Active Labor Market Policies
Help Unemployed Workers to Find and Keep
Regular Jobs?
Jan C. van Ours February 2000
No. 288: Consumption Patterns of the New
Elite in Zimbabwe
Russell Belk February 2000
No. 287: Barter in Transition Economies:
Competing Explanations Confront Ukranian
Data
Dalia Marin, Daniel Kaufmann and
Bogdan Gorochowskij
January 2000
No. 286: The Quest for Pension Reform:
Poland’s Security through Diversity
Marek Góra and Michael Rutkowski January 2000
No. 285: Disorganization and Financial
Collapse
Dalia Marin and Monika Schnitzer October 1999
No. 284: Coordinating Changes in M-form
and U-form Organizations
Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland and
Chenggang Xu
May 1999
No. 283: Why Russian Workers Do Not Move:
Attachment of Workers Through In-Kind
Payments
Guido Friebel and Sergei Guriev October 1999
No. 282: Lessons From Fiascos in Russian
Corporate Governance
Merritt B. Fox and Michael A. Heller October 1999
No. 281: Income Distribution and Price
Controls: Targeting a Social Safety Net
During Economic Transition
Michael Alexeev and James Leitzel March 1999THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 280: Starting Positions, Reform Speed,
and Economic Outcomes in Transitioning
Economies
William Hallagan and Zhang Jun January 2000
No. 279 : The Value of Prominent Directors Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer October 1999
No. 278: The System Paradigm János Kornai April 1998
No. 277: The Developmental Consequences of
Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition
from Socialism to Capitalism: The
Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in
Hungary
Lawrence Peter King September 1999
No. 276: Stability and Disorder: An
Evolutionary Analysis of Russia’s Virtual
Economy
Clifford Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes November 1999
No. 275: Limiting Government Predation
Through Anonymous Banking: A Theory with
Evidence from China.
Chong-En Bai, David D. Li, Yingyi Qian
and Yijiang Wang
July 1999
No. 274: Transition with Labour Supply Tito Boeri December 1999
No. 273: Sectoral Restructuring and Labor
Mobility: A Comparative Look at the Czech
Republic
Vit Sorm and Katherine Terrell November 1999
No. 272: Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics “Returns to Human
Capital Under the Communist Wage Grid and
During the Transition to a Market Economy”
Vol. 27, pp. 33-60 1999.
Daniel Munich, Jan Svejnar and Katherine
Terrell
October 1999
No. 271: Barter in Russia: Liquidity Shortage
Versus Lack of Restructuring
Sophie Brana and Mathilde Maurel June 1999
No. 270: Tests for Efficient Financial
Intermediation with Application to China
Albert Park and Kaja Sehrt March 1999
No. 269a: Russian Privatization and
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman and
Anna Tarassova
May 2000
No. 269: Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong?
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman and
Anna Tarassova
September 1999
No. 268: Are Russians Really Ready for
Capitalism?
Susan Linz September 1999
No. 267: Do Stock Markets Promote
Economic Growth?
Randall K. Filer, Jan Hanousek and Nauro
Campos
September 1999
No. 266: Objectivity, Proximity and
Adaptability in Corporate Governance
Arnoud W.A Boot and Jonathan R. Macey September 1999
No. 265: When the Future is not What it Used
to Be: Lessons from the Western European
Experience to Forecasting Education and
Training in Transitional Economies
Nauro F. Campos, Gerard Hughes, Stepan
Jurajda, and Daniel Munich
September 1999
No. 264: The Institutional Foundation of
Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIEs) in China
Yasheng Huang September 1999
No. 263: The Changing Corporate
Governance Paradigm: Implications for
Transition and Developing Countries
Erik Berglof and Ernst-Ludwig von
Thadden
June 1999
No. 262: Law Enforcement and Transition Gerard Roland and Thierry Verdier May 1999THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 261: Soft Budget Constraints, Pecuniary
Externality, and the Dual Track System
Jiahua Che June 2000
No. 260: Missing Market in Labor Quality:
The Role of Quality Markets in Transition
Gary H. Jefferson July 1999
No. 259: Do Corporate Global Environmental
Standards in Emerging Markets Create or
Destroy Market Value
Glen Dowell, Stuart Hart and Bernard
Yeung
June 1999
No. 258: Public Training and Outflows from
Unemployment
Patrick A. Puhani June 1999
No. 257: Ownership Versus Environment:
Why are Public Sector Firms Inefficient?
Ann P. Bartel and Ann E. Harrison June 1999
No. 256: Taxation and Evasion in the
Presence of Exortion by Organized Crime
Michael Alexeev, Eckhard Janeba and
Stefan Osborne
November 1999
No. 255: Revisiting Hungary’s Bankruptcy
Episode
John P. Bonin and Mark E. Schaffer September 1999
No. 254: FDI  in Emerging Markets: A Home-
Country View
Marina v.N Whitman June 1999
No. 253: The Asian Financial Crisis: What
Happened, and What is to be Done
Jeffrey D. Sachs and Wing Thye Woo January 1999
No. 252: Organizational Law as Asset
Partitioning
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman September 1999
No. 251: Consumer Behavior Research in
Emerging Consumer Markets: the Case of the
Optimum Stimulation Level in South Africa
Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp and Steven
M. Burgess
September 1999
No. 250: Property Rights Formation and the
Organization of Exchange and Production in
Rural China
Matthew A. Turner, Loren Brandt, and
Scott Rozelle
July 1998
No. 249: Impacts of the Indonesian Economic
Crisis: Price Changes and the Poor
James Levinsohn, Steven Berry, and Jed
Friedman
June 1999
No. 248: Internal Barriers in the Transition of
Enterprises from Central Plan to Market
Charalambos Vlachoutsicos July 1999
No. 247: Spillovers from Multinationals in
Developing Countries: the Mechanisms at
Work
Richard E. Caves June 1999
No. 246: Dynamism and Inertia on the
Russian Labour Market: A Model of
Segmentation
Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik-Leygonie,
Thierry Verdier, Stanislav Kolenikov and
Elena Paltseva
May 1999
No. 245: Lessons from Bank Privatization in
Central Europe
John Bonin and Paul Wachtel May 1999
No. 244: Nominal-Real Tradeoffs and the
Effects of Monetary Policy: the Romanian
Experience
Christian Popa December 1998
No. 243: Privatization, Political Risk and
Stock Market Development in Emerging
Economies
Enrico C. Perotti and Pieter van Oijen March 1999
No. 242: Investment Financing in Russian
Financial-Industrial Groups
Enrico C. Perotti and Stanislav Gelfer October 1998
No. 241: Can governments maintain hard
budget constraints?  Bank lending and
financial isolation in Romania
Octavian Carare, Constantijn Claessens,
Enrico C. Perotti
January 1999THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 240: Democratic Institutions and
Economic Reform: the Polish Case
John E. Jackson, Jacek Klich, and
Krystyna Poznanska
April 1998
No. 239: A Longitudinal Study of IJV
Performance in Eastern Europe
Keith D. Brouthers and Gary Bamossy June 1999
No. 238: Published in: Journal of Business
Venturing, “Firm Creation and Economic
Transitions” Vol. 14, Iss. 5,6 Sep/Nov 1999,
pp. 427-450.
John E. Jackson, Jacek Klich, Krystyna
Poznanska
July 1998
No. 237: Analysis of Entrepreneurial Attitudes
in Poland
John E. Jackson and Aleksander S.
Marcinkowski
March 1997
No. 236: Investment and Finance in De Novo
Private Firms: Empirical Results from the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland
Andrzej Bratkowski, Irena Grosfeld, Jacek
Rostowski
April 1999
No. 235: Does a Soft Macroeconomic
Environment Induce Restructuring on the
Microeconomic Level during the Transition
Period?  Evidence from Investment Behavior
of Czech Enterprises
Lubomír Lízal June 1999
No. 234: Banking Reform in China: Gradually
Strengthening Pillar or Fragile Reed?
John Bonin June 1999
No. 233: Theories of Soft Budget Constraints
and the Analysis of Banking Crises
Janet Mitchell March 1999
No. 232: Unemployment Risk, Precautionary
Savings, and Moonlighting in Russia
Alessandra Guariglia and Byung-Yeon
Kim
June 1999
No. 231: Investing in Turbulent Times: The
Investment Behavior of Polish Firms in the
Transition
Josef C. Brada, Arthur E. King, and Chia-
Ying Ma
April 1999
No. 230: The End of Moderate Inflation in
Three Transition Economies?
Josef C. Brada and Ali M. Kutan April 1999
No. 229:  Back to the Future: The Growth
Prospects of Transition Economies
Reconsidered
Nauro F. Campos April 1999
No. 228:  The Enterprise Isolation Program in
Russia
Simeon Djankov April 1999
No. 227: Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Ownership
Concentration and Corporate Performance in
the Czech Republic” 27(3), September 1999,
pp. 498-513.
Stijn Claessens and Simeon Djankov April 1999
No. 226:  Unemployment Benefit Entitlement
and Training Effects in Poland during
Transition
Patrick A. Puhani March 1999
No. 225:  Transition at Whirlpool-Tatramat:
Case Studies
Hans Brechbuhl and Sonia Ferencikova March 1999
No. 224:  Measuring Progress in Transition
and Towards EU Accession:  A Comparison of
Manufacturing Firms in Poland, Romania,
and Spain
Wendy Carlin, Saul Estrin, and Mark
Schaffer
March 1999
No. 223:  Product Market Competition in
Transition Economies:  Increasing Varieties
and Consumer Loyalty
Mitsutoshi M. Adachi March 1999THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 222:  Opaque Markets and Rapid Growth:
the Superiority of Bank-Centered Financial
Systems for Developing Nations
Rodney Wallace July 1999
No. 221:  Technology Spillovers through
Foreign Direct Investment
Yuko Kinoshita January 1999
No. 220:  Managerial, Expertise and Team
Centered Forms of Organizing: A Cross-
Cultural Exploration of Independence in
Engineering Work
Leslie Perlow January 1999
No. 219:  Household Structure and Labor
Demand in Agriculture: Testing for
Separability in Rural China
Audra J. Bowlus and Terry Sicular January 1999
No. 218:  Competing Strategies of FDI and
Technology Transfer to China: American and
Japanese Firms
W. Mark Fruin and Penelope Prime January 1999
No. 217 Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Returns to
Mobility in the Transition to a Market
Economy” Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1999, pp. 4-
Tito Boeri and Christopher J. Flinn January 1999
No. 216 Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Labor Market
Policies and Unemployment in the Czech
Republic.”  Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1999, pp.
33-60.
Katherine Terrell and Vit Sorm November 1998
No. 215 Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Active Labor
Market Policies in Poland: Human Capital
Enhancement, Stigmatization or Benefit
Churning?” Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1999, pp.
61-
Jochen Kluve, Hartmut Lehmann, and
Christoph M. Schmidt
December 1998
No. 214 Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Does the
Slovenian Public Work Program Increase
Participants' Chances to Find a Job?” Vol.
27, No.1, March 1999, pp. 113-
Milan Vodopivec December 1998
No. 213 Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Effects of Active
Labor Market Programs on the Transition
Rate from Unemployment into Regular Jobs in
the Slovak Republic.” Vol. 27, No. 1, March
1999, pp. 90-
Martina Lubyova and Jan C. van Ours December 1998
No. 212:  The Marketing System in Bulgarian
Livestock Production – The Present State and
Evolutionary Processes During the Period of
Economic Transition
Yordan Staykov, Team Leader October 1998
No. 211:  Bankruptcy Experience in Hungary
and the Czech Republic
Janet Mitchell October 1998
No 210:  Values, Optimum Stimulation Levels
and Brand Loyalty:  New Scales in New
Populations
Steven M. Burgess and Mari Harris September 1998THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 209:  Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control
and Economic Growth
Randall K. Morck, David A. Stangeland,
and Bernard Yeung
September 1998
No. 208: A Cultural Analysis of Homosocial
Reproduction and Contesting Claims to
Competence in Transitional Firms
Michael D. Kennedy July 1998
No. 207: From Survival to Success: The
Journey of Corporate Transformation at
Haier. Forthcoming in Teaching the
Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational Change
in Transition Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Arthur Yeung and Kenneth DeWoskin July 1998
No. 206: Why Do People Work If They Are
Not Paid?  An Example from Eastern Europe.
Forthcoming in Teaching the Dinosaurs to
Dance: Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Irina L. Zinovieva May 1998
No. 205: Firm Ownership and Work
Motivation in Bulgaria and Hungary: An
Empirical Study of the Transition in the Mid-
1990s. Forthcoming in Teaching the
Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational Change
in Transition Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Robert A. Roe, Irina L. Zinovieva,
Elizabeth Dienes, and Laurens A. ten Horn
May 1998
No. 204: Human Resource Management in the
Restructuring of Chinese Joint Ventures.
Forthcoming in Teaching the Dinosaurs to
Dance: Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Nandani Lynton April 1998
No. 203: Emergent Compensation Strategies
in Post-Socialist Poland: Understanding the
Cognitive Underpinnings of Management
Practices in a Transition Economy.
Forthcoming in Teaching the Dinosaurs to
Dance: Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Marc Weinstein March 1998
No. 202: Corporate Transformation and
Organizational Learning: The People’s
Republic of China. Forthcoming in Teaching
the Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational
Change in Transition Economies ed. Daniel
Denison.
Meinolf Dierkes and Zhang Xinhua March 1998
No. 201: Foreign Direct Investment as a
Factor of Change: The Case of Slovakia.
Forthcoming in Teaching the Dinosaurs to
Dance: Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Sonia Ferencikova February 1998
No. 200: Radical versus Incremental Change:
The Role of Capabilities, Competition, and
Leaders. Forthcoming in Teaching the
Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational Change
in Transition Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Karen L. Newman February 1998THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 199: The Emergence of Market Practices
in China’s Economic Transition: Price Setting
Practices in Shanghai’s Industrial Firms.
Forthcoming in Teaching the Dinosaurs to
Dance: Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Douglas Guthrie February 1998
No. 198: The Application of Change
Management Methods at Business
Organizations Operating in Hungary:
Challenges in the Business and Cultural
Environment and First Practical Experiences.
Forthcoming in Teaching the Dinosaurs to
Dance: Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Dr. János Fehér January 1998
No. 197: Organizational Changes in Russian
Industrial Enterprises: Mutation of Decision-
Making Structures and Transformations of
Ownership. Forthcoming in Teaching the
Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational Change
in Transition Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Igor B. Gurkov January 1998
No. 196: Understanding and Managing
Challenges to the Romanian Companies
during Transition. Forthcoming in Teaching
the Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational
Change in Transition Economies ed. Daniel
Denison.
Dan Candea and Rodica M. Candea January 1998
No. 195: Insider Lending and Economic
Transition: The Structure, Function, and
Performance Impact of Finance Companies in
Chinese Business Groups. Forthcoming in
Teaching the Dinosaurs to Dance:
Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Lisa A. Keister December 1997
No. 194: Japanese Investment in Transitional
Economies: Characteristics and Performance.
Forthcoming in Teaching the Dinosaurs to
Dance: Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Paul W. Beamish and Andrew Delios November 1997
No. 193: Building Successful Companies in
Transition Economies. Forthcoming in
Teaching the Dinosaurs to Dance:
Organizational Change in Transition
Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Dr. Ivan Perlaki January 1998
No. 192: Russian Communitariansim: An
Invisible Fist in the Transformation Process of
Russia. Forthcoming in Teaching the
Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational Change
in Transition Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Charalambos Vlachoutsicos July 1998
No. 191: Teaching the Dinosaurs to Dance Michal Cakrt September 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 190: Strategic Restructuring: Making
Capitalism in Post-Communist Eastern
Europe.  Forthcoming in Teaching the
Dinosaurs to Dance: Organizational Change
in Transition Economies ed. Daniel Denison.
Lawrence P. King September 1997
No. 189: Published in: Regional Science and
Urban Economics, “Russia’s Internal
Border”, 29 (5), September 1999.
Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong July 1998
No. 187: Corporate Structure and
Performance in Hungary
László Halpern and Gábor Kórsöi July 1998
No. 186: Performance of Czech Companies by
Ownership Structure
Andrew Weiss and Georgiy Nikitin June 1998
No. 185: Firm Performance in Bulgaria and
Estonia: The effects of competitive pressure,
financial pressure and disorganisation
Jozef Konings July 1998
No. 184: Investment and Wages during the
Transition: Evidence from Slovene Firms
Janez Prasnikar and Jan Svejnar July 1998
No. 183: Investment Portfolio under Soft
Budget: Implications for Growth, Volatility
and Savings
Chongen Bai and Yijiang Wang July 1998
No. 181: Delegation and Delay in Bank
Privatization
Loránd Ambrus-Lakatos and Ulrich Hege July 1998
No. 180: Financing Mechanisms and R&D
Investment
Haizhou Huang and Chenggang Xu July 1998
No. 179: Organizational Culture and
Effectiveness: The Case of Foreign Firms in
Russia
Carl F. Fey and Daniel R. Denison January 1999
No. 178: Output and Unemployment
Dynamics in Transition
Vivek H. Dehejia and Douglas W. Dwyer January 1998
No. 177: Published in: Economics of
Transition,, “Bureaucracies in the Russian
Voucher Privatization” Vol. 8, No. 1, 2000,
pp. 37-57.
Guido Friebel June 1998
No. 176: Chronic Moderate Inflation in
Transition: The Tale of Hungary
János Vincze June 1998
No. 175: Privatisation and Market Structure
in a Transition Economy
John Bennett and James Maw June 1998
No. 174: Ownership and Managerial
Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside
Ownership
Patrick Bolton and Chenggang Xu June 1998
No. 173: Intragovernment Procurement  of
Local Public Good: A Theory of
Decentralization in Nondemocratic
Government
Chong-en Bai, Yu Pan and Yijiang Wang June 1998
No. 172: Political Instability and Growth in
Proprietary Economies
Jody Overland and Michael Spagat August 1998
No. 171: Published in Post-Communist
Economies, “Framework Issues in the
Privatization Strategies of the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland” Vol. 11, no. 1 March
1999.
Morris Bornstein June 1998THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 170: Published in: European Journal of
Political Economy “Privatization, Ownership
Structure and Transparency: How to Measure
a Real Involvement of the State” 15(4),
November 1999, pp. 605-18.
Frantisek Turnovec May 1998
No. 169 Published in: American Economic
Review, “Unemployment and the Social Safety
Net during Transitions to a Market Economy:
Evidence from Czech and Slovak Men.” Vol.
88, No. 5, Dec. 1998, pp. 1117-1142.
John C. Ham, Jan Svejnar, and Katherine
Terrell
December 1998
No. 167: Voucher Privatization with
Investment Funds: An Institutional Analysis
David Ellerman March 1998
No. 166: Published in: Marketing Issues in
Transitional Economies, “Value Priorities
and Consumer Behavior in a Transitional
Economy: The Case of South Africa” ed.
Rajeev Batra.
Steven M. Burgess and Jan-Benedict E.M.
Steenkamp
August 1998
No. 164: Finance and Investment in
Transition: Czech Enterprises, 1993-1994
Ronald Anderson and Chantal Kegels September 1997
No. 163: European Union Trade and
Investment Flows U-Shaping Industrial
Output in Central and Eastern Europe:
Theory and Evidence
Alexander Repkine and Patrick P. Walsh April 1998
No. 162: Skill Acquisition and Private Firm
Creation in Transition Economies
Zuzana Brixiova and Wenli Li October 1999
No. 161: Corruption in Transition Susanto Basu and David D. Li May 1998
No. 160a: Tenures that Shook the World:
Worker Turnover in Russia, Poland and
Britain
Hartmut Lehmann and Jonathan
Wadsworth
November 1999
No. 160: Tenures that Shook the World:
Worker Turnover in the Russian Federation
and Poland
Hartmut Lehmann and Jonathan
Wadsworth
June 1998
No. 159: Does Market Structure Matter?  New
Evidence from Russia
Annette N. Brown and J. David Brown June 1998
No. 158: Structural Adjustment and Regional
Long Term Unemployment in Poland
Hartmut Lehmann and Patrick P. Walsh June 1997
No. 157: Baby Boom or Bust?  Changing
Fertility in Post-Communist Czech Republic
and Slovakia
Robert S. Chase April 1998
No. 156 Published in: Leadership and
Organization Development Journal,
“Leading Radical Change in Transition
Economies.”  Vol. 19, No. 6, 1998, pp. 309-
324.
Karen L. Newman June 1998
No. 155 Published in: Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, “From Theory into
Practice?  Restructuring and Dynamism in
Transition Economies.” Vol. 13, No. 2,
Summer 1997, pp. 77-105.
Wendy Carlin and Michael Landesmann June 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 154: The Model and the Reality:
Assessment of Vietnamese SOE Reform—
Implementation at the Firm Level
Edmund Malesky, Vu Thanh Hung, Vu Thi
Dieu Anh, and Nancy K. Napier
July 1998
No. 153 Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Causes of the Soft
Budget Constraint: Evidence on Three
Explanations.” Vol. 26, No. 1, March 1998,
pp. 104-116.
David D. Li and Minsong Liang March 1998
No. 152 Published in: Comparative Economic
Studies, “Enterprise Restructuring in Russia’s
Transition Economy: Formal and Informal
Mechanisms.” Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer 1998,
pp. 5-52.
Susan J. Linz and Gary Krueger April 1998
No. 151:  Labor Productivity in Transition:  A
Regional Analysis of Russian Industry
Susan J. Linz May 1998
No. 150: Tax Avoidance and the Allocation of
Credit. Forthcoming in Financial Systems in
Transition: The Design of Financial Systems
in Central Europe eds. Anna Meyendorff and
Anjan Thakor.
Anna Meyendorff June 1998
No. 149:  Commitment, Versatility and
Balance:  Determinants of Work Time
Standards and Norms in a Multi-Country
Study of Software Engineers
Leslie Perlow and Ron Fortgang April 1998
No. 148:  Changes in Poland’s Transfer
Payments in the 1990s:  the Fate of
Pensioners
Bozena Leven June 1998
No. 147:  Environmental Protection and
Economic Development:  The Case of the
Huaihe River Basin Cleanup Plan
Robert Letovsky, Reze Ramazani, and
Debra Murphy
June 1998
No. 146:  Chief Executive Compensation
During Early Transition:  Further Evidence
from Bulgaria
Derek C. Jones, Takao Kato, and Jeffrey
Miller
June 1998
No. 145 Published in: Economics of
Transition, “Women’s Unemployment During
the Transition: Evidence from Czech and
Slovak Micro Data,” Vol. 7, No. 1, May 1999,
pp. 47-78.
John Ham, Jan Svejnar, and  Katherine
Terrell
May 1998
No. 144:  Investment and Wages in Slovenia Janez Prasnikar May 1998
No. 143 Published in: Review of Financial
Studies, “Optimal Bankruptcy Laws Across
Different Economic Systems,” 12(2), Summer
1999, pgs. 347-77.
Elazar Berkovitch and Ronen Israel March 1998
No. 142: Industrial Policy and Poverty in
Transition Economies: Two Steps Forward or
One Step Back?
Susan J. Linz March 1998
No. 141:  Collective Ownership and
Privatization of China’s Village Enterprises
Suwen Pan and Albert Park April 1998
No. 140: A Comparative Look at Labor
Mobility in the Czech Republic: Where have
all the Workers Gone?
Vit Sorm and Katherine Terrell April 1999THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 139: The Failure of the Government-Led
Program of Corporate Reorganization in
Romania
Simeon Djankov and Kosali Ilayperuma September 1997
No. 138: Ownership and Employment in
Russian Industry: 1992-1995
Susan J. Linz March 1998
No. 137 Published in: Journal of Political
Economy, “Reform Without Losers: An
Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track
Approach to Transition,” Feb. 2000; Vol. 108,
Iss.1; pg. 120
Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gerard
Roland
November 1997
No. 136 Published in: European Economic
Review, “The Political Economy of Mass
Privatization and the Risk of Expropriation,”
44(2), February 2000, pgs. 393-421
Klaus M. Schmidt March 1998
No. 135: Radical Organizational Change: The
Role of Starting Conditions, Competition, and
Leaders
Karen L. Newman January 1998
No. 134: To Restructure or Not to
Restructure: Informal Activities and
Enterprise Behavior in Transition
Clifford Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes May 1998
No. 133: Management 101: Behavior of Firms
in Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada March 1998
No. 132 Published in: Quarterly Journal of
Economics, “Interfirm Relationships and
Informal Credit in Vietnam,” 114(4), Nov.
1999, pgs. 1285-1320
John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff February 1998
No. 131 Published in: Comparative Economic
Studies, “Will Restructuring Hungarian
Companies Innovate? An Investigation Based
on Joseph Berliner’s Analysis of Innovation in
Soviet Industry.” Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer
1998, pp. 53-74.
John B. Bonin and Istvan Abel March 1998
No. 130: Published in The American
Economic Review, “Changing Incentives of
the Chinese Bureaucracy.” May, 1998.
David D. Li January 1998
No. 129: Restructuring Investment in
Transition: A Model of the Enterprise
Decision
Richard E. Ericson January 1998
No. 128 Published in: Comparative Economic
Studies, “Job Rights in Russian Firms:
Endangered or Extinct Institutions?” Vol. 40,
No. 4, Winter 1998, pp. 1-32.
Susan J. Linz January 1998
No. 127: Accounting for Growth in Post-
Soviet Russia
Daniel Berkowitz and David N. DeJong January 1998
No. 126 Published in: Economics of
Transition, “From Federalism, Chinese Style,
to Privatization Chinese Style,” 7(1), 1999,
pgs. 103-31
Yuanzheng Cao, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R.
Weingast
December 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 125: Market Discipline in Conglomerate
Banks: Is an Internal Allocation of Cost of
Capital Necessary as Incentive Device?
Forthcoming in Financial Systems in
Transition: The Design of Financial Systems
in Central Europe eds. Anna Meyendorff and
Anjan Thakor.
Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjolein Schmeits November 1997
No. 124: Financial Discipline in the
Enterprise Sector in Transition Countries:
How Does China Compare?
Shumei Gao and Mark E. Schaffer February 1998
No. 123: Considerations of an Emerging
Marketplace: Managers’ Perceptions in the
Southern African Economic Community
Brent Chrite and David Hudson February 1998
No. 122: A Model of the Informal Economy in
Transition Economies
Simon Commander and Andrei
Tolstopiatenko
November 1997
No. 121: Local Labour Market Dynamics in
the Czech and Slovak Republics
Peter Huber and Andreas Worgotter November 1997
No. 121: Local Labour Market Dynamics in
the Czech and Slovak Republics
Peter Huber and Andreas Worgotter November 1997
No. 119: Institutional Upheaval and Company
Transformation in Emerging Market
Economies
Karen L. Newman March 1998
No. 118: Industrial Decline and Labor
Reallocation in Romania
John S. Earle October 1997
No. 117: Notes for an Essay on the Soft
Budget Constraint
Lorand Ambrus-Lakatos January 1997
No. 116: Labor Demand During Transition in
Hungary
Gabor Korosi October 1997
No. 115: Enterprise Performance and
Managers’ Profiles
Simeon Djankov and Stijn Claessens December 1997
No. 114b Employment and Wages in
Enterprises under Communism and in
Transition: Evidence From Central Europe
and Russia
Swati Basu, Saul Estrin, and Jan Svejnar April 2000
No. 114: Employment and Wage Behavior of
Enterprises in Transitional Economies
Swati Basu, Saul Estrin, and Jan Svejnar October 1997
No. 113: Preliminary Evidence on Active
Labor Programs’ Impact in Hungary and
Poland
Christopher J. O’Leary October 1997
No. 111: Unemployment Benefits and
Incentives in Hungary: New Evidence
Joachim Wolff October 1997
No. 110: Published in: Empirical Economics,
“Long-Term Unemployment, Unemployment
Benefits and Social Assistance: The Polish
Experience” Empirical-Economics; 23(1-2),
1998, pages 55-85.
Marek Gora and Christoph M. Schmidt April 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 109 Published in: Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, “Markets for Communist
Human Capital: Returns to Education and
Experience in Post-Communist Czech
Republic and Slovakia.” Vol. 51, No. 3, April
1998, pp. 401-423.
Robert S. Chase October 1997
No. 107: The Worker-Firm Matching in the
Transition: (Why) Are the Czechs More
Successful Than Others?
Daniel Münich, Jan Svejnar, and
Katherine Terrell
October 1997
No. 106 Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Job Creation, Job
Destruction and Growth of Newly Established,
Privatized and State-Owned Enterprises in
Transition Economies: Survey Evidence from
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania,” Vol. 26,
No.3, September 1998, pp. 429-445.
Valentijn Bilsen and Jozef Konings September 1998
No. 105: Getting Behind the East-West
[German] Wage Differential: Theory and
Evidence
Michael Burda and Christoph Schmidt May 1997
No. 104: The Birth of the “Wage Curve” in
Hungary, 1989-95
Gabor Kertesi and Janos Kollo October 1997
No. 103: Published in: Journal of
Comparative Economics, “Grime and
Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears
in the Russian Federation” 27, 595-617
(1999).
Hartmut Lehmann, Jonathan Wadsworth,
and Alessandro Acquisti
October 1997
No. 102: Social Networks in Transition Lorena Barberia, Simon Johnson, and
Daniel Kaufmann
October 1997
No. 101: Depreciation and Russian Corporate
Finance: A Pragmatic Approach to Surviving
the Transition
Susan J. Linz November 1997
No. 100: Romanian Financial System Reform Anna Meyendorff and Anjan V. Thakor November 1997
No. 99: Proceedings of the Conference on
Strategic Alliances in Transitional Economies,
held May 20, 1997 at the Davidson Institute
Edited by Cynthia Koch May 1997
No. 98: Institutions, Strain and the
Underground Economy
Daniel Daianu and Lucian Albu November 1997
No. 97: Structure and Strain in Explaining
Inter-Enterprise Arrears
Daniel Daianu November 1997
No. 96: Resource Misallocation and Strain:
Explaining Shocks in Post-Command
Economies
Daniel Daianu November 1997
No. 95: Published in: Finance-a-Uver,
“Czech Money Market: Emerging Links
Among Interest Rates.” 48(2) 1998 pp. 99-
109.
Jan Hanousek and Evzen Kocenda November 1997
No. 94: Pre-Reform Industry and the
State Monopsony in China
Xiao-Yuan Dong and Louis Putterman October 1997
No. 93: China’s State-Owned Enterprises
In the First Reform Decade:
An Analysis of a Declining Monopsony
Xiao-Yuan Dong and Louis Putterman October 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 92: Expatriate Management in the Czech
Republic
Richard B. Peterson September 1997
No. 91: China and the Idea of Economic
Reform
Thomas G. Rawski April 1997
No. 90 Published in: China Economic
Review, “China’s State Enterprise Reform: An
Overseas Perspective.” Vol. 8, Spring 1997,
pp. 89-98.
Thomas G. Rawski July 1997
No. 89: The Economic Determinants of
Internal Migration Flows in Russia During
Transition
Annette N. Brown July 1997
No. 88: Gender Wage Gaps in China’s Labor
Market: Size, Structure, Trends
Margaret Maurer-Fazio, Thomas G.
Rawski, and Wei Zhang
July 1997
No. 87: Privatisation in Central and Eastern
Europe
Saul Estrin June 1997
No. 86: Published in : Economics of
Transition, “The Effect of Privatization on
Wealth Distribution in Russia.” v. 7, no. 2,
1999, pp. 449-65
Michael Alexeev February 1998
No. 85: Was Privatization in Eastern Germany
a Special Case? Some Lessons from the
Treuhand
Uwe Siegmund September 1997
No. 84: Start-ups and Transition Daniel M. Berkowitz and David J. Cooper September 1997
No. 83: Which Enterprises (Believe They)
Have Soft Budgets after Mass Privatization?
Evidence from Mongolia
James Anderson, Georges Korsun, and
Peter Murrell
October 1997
No. 82: Published in: European Economic
Review, “Unemployment Dynamics and the
Restructuring of the Slovak Unemployment
Benefit System.” April, 1997.
Martina Lubyova and Jan C. van Ours June 1997
No. 81: Determinants of Unemployment
Duration in Russia
Mark C. Foley August 1997
No. 80: The Many Faces of Information
Disclosure
Arnoud W.A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor October 1997
No. 79: Published in: Journal of Finance,
“Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity
Markets.”v.22, iss. 2, 2000, pp. 565-613
Geert Bekaert and Campbell R. Harvey August 1997
No. 78: The Relationship Between Economic
Factors and Equity Markets in Central Europe
Jan Hanousek and Randall K. Filer June 1997
No. 77 Published in: Economics of
Transition, “A Gini Decomposition Analysis
of Inequality in the Czech and Slovak
Republics During the Transition,” Vol. 6,
No.1, May 1998, pp. 23-46.
Thesia I. Garner and Katherine Terrell May 1998
No. 76: China’s Emerging Market for
Property Rights: Theoretical and Empirical
Perspectives
Gary H. Jefferson and Thomas G. Rawski June 1997
No. 75b: Test of Permanent Income
Hypothesis on Czech Voucher Privatization
Jan Hanousek and Zdenek Tima October 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 74: Determinants of Performance of
Manufacturing Firms in Seven European
Transition Economies
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and
Gerhard Pohl
February 1997
No. 73 Published in: Economics of
Transition, “The Restructuring of Large
Firms in Slovak Republic.”  Vol. 6, No. 1, May
1998, pp. 67-85
Simeon Djankov and Gerhard Pohl May 1998
No. 72:  Law, Relationships, and Private
Enforcement: Transactional Strategies of
Russian Enterprises
Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell, and
Randi Ryterman
November 1998
No. 71: Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due:
The Changing Role of Rural Financial
Institutions in China
Albert Park, Loren Brandt, and John Giles March 1997
No. 70: Privatization Versus Competition:
Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia
John S. Earle and Saul Estrin Spring 1997
No. 69:  Russian Managers under Storm:
Explicit Reality and Implicit Leadership
Theories (A Pilot Exploration)
Igor Gurkov October 1998
No. 68: The Political Economy of Central-
Local Relations in China: Inflation and
Investment Controls During the Reform Era
Yasheng Huang Spring 1997
No. 67: Between Two Coordination Failures:
Automotive Industrial Policy in China with a
Comparison to Korea
Yasheng Huang Spring 1997
No. 66 Published in: Post-Soviet Geography
and Economics, “Red Executives in Russia’s
Transition Economy.”  Vol. 27, No. 10,
November 1996, pp. 633-651.
Susan J. Linz January 1997
No. 65 Published in: Industrial and
Corporate Change, “On the Sequencing of
Privatization in Transition Economies.”  Vol.
7, No. 1, 1998.
Gautam Ahuja and Sumit K. Majumdar April 1997
No. 64: Published in: Journal of Law and
Economics, “Foreign Ownership and
Profitability: Property Rights, Control and the
Performance of Firms in Indian Industry”
42(1), April 1999, pp. 209-38.
Pradeep K. Chhibber and Sumit K.
Majumdar
April 1997
No. 63: How Taxing Is Corruption on
International Investors?
Shang-Jin Wei February 1997
No. 62: What Can We Learn from the
Experience of Transitional Economies with
Labour Market Policies?
Tito Boeri 1997
No. 61: Published in: Accounting
Organizations and Society, “Economic
Transition, Strategy and the Evolution of
Management Accounting Practices: The Case
of India” 24(5,6), Jul/Aug 1999, pp. 379-412.
Shannon W. Anderson and William N.
Lanen
April 1997
No. 60a: Enterprise Investment During the
Transition: Evidence from Czech Panel Data
Lubomír Lizal and Jan Svejnar December 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 59: Published in: Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, “Institutional
Environment, Community Government, and
Corporate Governance: Understanding
China’s Township-Village Enterprises.”
14(1), April 1998, pages 1-23
Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian April 1997
No. 58: From the Grabbing Hand to the
Helping Hand
Jiahua Che June 2000
No. 57: Published in: Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, “The Unofficial Economy
in Transition.” 1: 1998.
Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and
Andrei Schleifer
June 1997
No. 56: Taxes and Government Incentives:
Eastern Europe vs. China
Roger H. Gordon and David D. Li April 1997
No. 55: Corruption and Reform Susanto Basu and David Li June 1996
No. 54: Decentralization and the
Macroeconomic Consequences of
Commitment to State-Owned Firms
Loren Brandt and Xiaodong Zhu June 1997
No. 53: Published in: The International
Journal of Industrial Organization,
“Competitive Shocks and Industrial Structure:
The Case of Polish Manufacturing.” August,
1999.  .
Pankaj Ghemawat and Robert E. Kennedy May 1997
No. 52: Published in: The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, “Insecure Property Rights and
Government Ownership of Firms.”  May,
1998.
Jiahua Che and Yingyi Qian May 1997
No. 51: Incentives, Scale Economies, and
Organizational Form
Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian, and Chenggang
Xu
May 1997
No. 50: Published in: Post-Soviet-Affairs,
“End of the Tunnel?  The Effects of Financial
Stabilization in Russia” April-June 1997,
pages 105-33
Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell, and Randi
Ryterman
March 1997
No. 49: The Evolution of Bank Credit Quality
in Transition: Theory and Evidence from
Romania
Enrico C. Perotti and Octavian Carare October 1996
No. 48: Where Do the Leaders Trade?
Information Revelation and Interactions
Between the Segments of Czech Capital
Markets
Jan Hanousek and Libor Nemecek May 1997
No. 47: Firms’ Heterogeneity in Transition:
Evidence from a Polish Panel Data Set
Irena Grosfeld and Jean-François Nivet May 1997
No. 46: Strategic Creditor Passivity,
Regulation, and Bank Bailouts
Janet Mitchell May 1997
No. 45a: Published in: Journal of Public
Economics, “Tax Rights in Transition
Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons.” 76,
2000, pp. 369-397
Daniel M. Berkowitz and Wei Li September 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 44a: The Information Content of Stock
Markets: Why do Emerging Markets have
Synchronous Stock Price Movements?
(forthcoming in the Journal of Financial
Economics).
Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, and
Wayne Yu
February 1999
No. 43: Agency in Project Screening and
Termination Decisions: Why Is Good Money
Thrown After Bad?
Chong-en Bai and Yijiang Wang May 1997
No. 42: Published in: Economics of
Transition, “Channels of Redistribution:
Inequality and Poverty in the Russian
Transition.” Vol. 7 (2) 1999.
Simon Commander, Andrei
Tolstopiatenko, and Ruslan Yemtsov
May 1997
No. 41: Published in: Economics of
Transition, “Labour Market Characteristics
and Profitability: Econometric Analysis of
Hungarian Exporting Firms, 1986-1995”
6(1), May 1998, pages 145-62
László Halpern and Gabor Korosi May 1997
No. 40: Published in: the Harvard Law
Review, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets.” January 1998.
Michael Heller February 1997
No. 39: Privatization and Managerial
Efficiency
Olivier Debande and Guido Friebel May 1997
No. 38 Published in: The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, “Disorganization.”  Vol. 112,
No. 4, November 1997, pp. 1091-1126.
Olivier Blanchard and Michael Kremer January 1997
No. 37: Published in: Economics of
Transition, “Transition and the Output Fall.”
7(1), 1999, pages 1-28.
Gérard Roland and Thierry Verdier March 1997
No. 36: Restructuring an Industry During
Transition: A Two-Period Model
Richard Ericson September 1996
No. 34:  The East-West Joint Venture: BC
Torsion Case Study
Sonia Ferencikova and Vern Terpstra December 1998
No. 33 Published in: Journal of Comparative
Economics, “Quantifying Price Liberalization
in Russia.” Vol. 26, No. 4, December 1998,
pp. 735-737.
Daniel Berkowitz, David DeJong, and
Steven Husted
December 1998
No. 32: What Can North Korea Learn from
China’s Market Reforms?
John McMillan September 1996
No. 31: Published in : China-Economic-
Review, “Towards a Model of China as a
Partially Reformed Developing Economy
Under a Semifederalist Government.” , 9(1),
Spring 1998, pages 1-23.
Yijiang Wang and Chun Chang March 1997
No. 30: Convergence in Output in Transition
Economies: Central and Eastern Europe,
1970-1995
Saul Estrin and Giovanni Urga February 1997
No. 29: Published in: Economics of
Transition, “Altered Band and Exchange
Volatility.” Volume 6, no. 1, 1998, 173-181.
Evzen Kocenda March 1997THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 28: Published in: Quarterly Journal of
Economics, “Public Versus Private
Ownership of Firms: Evidence from Rural
China.” Volume 113, no. 3, August 1998, 773-
808.
Hehui Jin and Yingyi Qian January 1997
No. 27: East-West Joint Ventures in a
Transitional Economy: The Case of Slovakia
Sonia Ferencikova March 1997
No. 26: Published in Economic Analysis
“Behavior of a Slovenian Firm in Transition”
Vol. 1, no. 1, 1998, 57-73.
Janez Prasnikar February 1997
No. 25: Cultural Encounters and Claims to
Expertise in Postcommunist Capitalism
Michael D. Kennedy February 1997
No. 24: ZVU a.s.: Investment Funds on the
Board of Directors of an Engineering Giant
Tory Wolff August 1995
No. 23: The Role of Investment Funds in the
Czech Republic (joint publication with Czech
Management Center)
Dusan Triska June 1996
No. 22: Czech Investment Fund Industry:
Development and Behaviour (joint publication
with Czech Management Center)
Richard Podpiera May 1996
No. 21: Restructuring of Czech Firms:  An
Example of Gama, a.s. (joint publication with
Czech Management Center)
Antonin Bulin June 1996
No. 20: YSE Funds:  A Story of Czech
Investment Funds (joint publication with
Czech Management Center)
Michal Otradovec November 1995
No. 19:  První Investicni a.s., The First
Investment Corporation  (joint publication
with Czech Management Center)
Jaroslav Jirasek August 1995
No. 18: PPF a.s., The First Private Investment
Fund (joint publication with Czech
Management Center)
Michal Otradovec November 1995
No. 17 Published in: Post-Soviet Geography
and Economics, “Russia’s Managers in
Transition: Pilferers or Paladins?”  Vol. 37,
o.7 (September 1996), pp. 397-426.
Susan J. Linz and Gary Krueger November 1996
No. 16: Banks in Transition—Investment
Opportunities in Central Europe and Russia
Edited Transcript from 31 May 1996
Conference in New York City
With commentary and edited by Anna
Meyendorff
January 1997
No. 15: Marketing in Transitional Economies:
Edited Transcript & Papers from 1 April 1996
Conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan
Compiled by The Davidson Institute December 1996
No. 14: Pensions in the Former Soviet Bloc:
Problems and Solutions.  Published by
Council on Foreign Relations.  “The Coming
Global Pension Crisis” New York, 1997
Jan Svejnar November 1996THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
Working Papers are available at:
 www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 13: Enterprise Restructuring and
Performance in the Transition.  Forthcoming
in Financial Systems in Transition: The
Design of Financial Systems in Central
Europe eds. Anna Meyendorff and Anjan
Thakor.
Lubomir Lizal, Miroslav Singer, and Jan
Svejnar
December 1996
No. 12 Published in: Journal of International
Marketing, “Executive Insights: Marketing
Issues and Challenges in Transitional
Economies.” Vol. 5, No. 4, 1997, pp. 95-114.
Also published in: Marketing Issues in
Transitional Economies ed. Rajeev Batra.
Rajeev Batra April 1997
No. 11: Worker Trust and System
Vulnerability in the Transition from Socialism
to Capitalism
Andrew Schotter August 1996
No. 10 Published in: Comparative Economic
Studies, “Russian Firms in Transition:
Champions, Challengers, and Chaff.”  Vol.
39, No.2, Summer 1997, pp. 1-36.
Susan J. Linz July 1996
No. 9: Corporate Debt Crisis and Bankruptcy
Law During the Transition: The Case of China
David D. Li and Shan Li December 1995
No. 8 Published in: Journal of Comparative
Economics, “A Theory of Ambiguous
Property Rights in Transition Economies: The
Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector.” Vol.
23, No. 1, August 1996, pp. 1-19.
David D. Li June 1996
No. 7: The Foreign Economic Contract Law of
China: Cases and Analysis
Dong-lai Li June 1993
No. 3: Bank Privatization in Hungary and the
Magyar Kulkereskedelmi Bank Transaction
Roger Kormendi and Karen Schnatterly May 1996
Replacing Nos. 1-2 & 4-6: Journal of
Comparative Economics Symposium on
“Bank Privatization in Central Europe and
Russia.”  Vol. 25, No. 1, August 1997.
No. 1 “Bank Privatization in Transitional
Economies” by Roger Kormendi and
Edward Snyder.  No. 2 “Transactional
Structures of Bank Privatizations in
Central Europe and Russia” by Anna
Meyendorff and Edward A. Snyder.  No. 4
“Bank Privatization in Poland: The Case
of Bank Slaski” by Jeffery Abarbaness and
John Bonin.  No. 5 “Bank Privatization in
Post-Communist Russia: The Case of
Zhilsotsbank” by Jeffery Abarbanell and
Anna Meyendorff and No. 6 “”The Czech
Republic’s Commercial Bank: Komercni
Banka” by Edward A. Snyder and Roger
C. Kormendi.
August 1997